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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Having considered a vital means whereby the Basel III framework and the Dodd Frank 
Act could achieve a respectable degree of harmonization, in the paper which precedes 
this, namely, the paper on “Harmonising Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act through 
International Accounting Standards – Reasons why International Accounting Standards 
Should Serve as “Thermostats”, this paper considers another important means of 
effectively achieving the aims and objectives of these important and major regulatory 
reforms aimed at achieving greater financial stability. 
 
In so doing, it will highlight challenges encountered by the Basel III framework, as well 
as that encountered by the Dodd Frank Act – particularly in the areas of enforcement, 
coordination and communication. In facilitating better enforcement, the need for high 
level principles, bright line rules and a more effective mandate will be emphasized. 
Furthermore, a system whereby greater collaboration between standard setters and 
national supervisors can be better facilitated requires effective coordination and 
communication mechanisms aimed at ensuring that vital decisions and information are 
communicated timely, accurately, effectively and completely. 
 
 
 
Keywords: financial stability, Volcker Rule, Basel III, Dodd Frank, European Systemic 
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A. Introduction 
 
Basel III and Dodd Frank macro prudential measures aimed at facilitating financial 
stability will, to a significant extent, realize their desired results where consistently 
applied across respective and applicable jurisdictions. Furthermore, enhanced 
transparency in relation to vital issues which include Basel internal credit models will 
help facilitate market discipline. With regards to efforts aimed at harmonizing Basel and 
Dodd Frank requirements, national supervisors will play crucial roles in the translation of 
the Basel Committee’s standards, as well as Dodd Frank requirements into national 
legislation.  
 
Three important actors are involved in the link between macro prudential power players 
- namely; standard setters, central banks and national supervisors. 
 
Micro prudential supervisors generally enforce rules whilst macro prudential 
coordinating bodies could establish rules which the micro prudential supervisor 
implements.2 As a result, there is need for clear unambiguous mandate and consistency in 
the application of standards, recommendations and regulations. 
However, “even where another agency has the power to determine micro prudential 
instruments and even though macro prudential standard setters write laws which are 
being enforced by national supervisors, such supervisors still operate with autonomy and 
accountability”.3 Such need for autonomy and accountability, as well as ensuring 
consistent application of decisions regarding the composition of regulatory capital (as 
well as consistency in the application of other standards) across jurisdictions, also 
provides greater justification for “clear and unambiguous” mandate. 
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 However, some micro prudential supervisors are endowed with the authority to issues rules and 
regulations. See Bank for International Settlements, “Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability” A 
Report by a Study Group May 2011 <http:www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> at page 56 
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The stipulation of objectives in a “clear and explicit” manner, is considered4 to be “a 
powerful way of achieving clarity about the mandate. The articulation of a financial 
stability strategy within a clearly specified mandate being one such possibility of 
achieving clarity about the mandate – for example, by embedding the highest level 
objectives in statute, and then amplifying and interpreting the evolving understanding of 
what they imply for policy through high level strategy statements.”5 
 
However, even though advantages exist in stipulating clear mandates, certain 
disadvantages also emanate from the stipulation of mandates in a “clear and explicit” way 
which does not provide for flexibility in relation to an area such as financial stability – an 
area which, to a large extent, involves contingency issues
6
 and uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Macro Prudential Oversight Frameworks 
 
The complementary and synergetic natures of functions relating to financial stability, 
as well as monetary policy setting functions, the need to couple such functions, is 
reflected by the following macro prudential oversight frameworks: 
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 “Given the current state of knowledge about what constitutes financial stability, and its main drivers, 
attempting to direct policy actions by way of explicit objectives, may create practical difficulties. Three 
reasons being: 
- It would be unfortunate if explicit objectives excluded policy options which turn out to be favorable 
- A clear objective statement directing the policy to ensure financial stability, without indicating the 
limits to which the authorities are prepared to insure private agents against tail risk events, may induce 
greater risk taking than available policy instruments are able to cope with. 
-The unpredictability of financial crises 
For these reasons, it is important to have flexible legislation which is adaptable to potential changes” see 
ibid at page 30 
 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review 
December 2010 at page 61 
 
 
 
 
  
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
Establishment and Objectives 
 
Whilst the US Financial Stability Oversight Council was established by the US Dodd 
Frank Act, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established on the basis of 
Article 95 of the EC Treaty as “a body without legal personality.”7 
 
The objective of the ESRB is considered to be three fold:
8
 
 
- Developing a European macro prudential perspective to address the problem 
of fragmented individual risk analysis at national level 
- Enhancing the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms by improving the 
interaction between micro and macro prudential analysis 
- Allowing for risk assessments to be translated into action by the relevant 
authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
C. The Need for Greater and More Commanding Mandate, High Level 
Principles and More Effective Enforcement. 
 
I. Non Binding Powers of the ESRB 
 
Article 5 of the Regulations
9 states that the ESRB “will not have any binding 
powers to impose measures on Member States or national authorities.” Instead, 
Commission proposals describe the ESRB as a “reputational body with a high level 
composition that should influence the actions of policy makers and supervisors by 
means of its moral authority.” 
 
By virtue of Article 95 of the EC Treaty,  mandate is also given to the ESRB to 
request for information from national supervisors where such information has not been 
provided. 
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recommendations or not.”10 
 
- The inability of the ESRB to issue binding recommendations has led some to 
describe it as a “toothless talking shop” which will duplicate activities already 
undertaken by other national and international institutions.
11
 
 
 
II.  Challenges Faced By the Volcker Rule 
 
In his testimony,
12
  Tarullo highlights the challenges encountered in the implementation 
of statutory provisions relating to the Volcker Rule
13
. Problems highlighted not only 
embrace the fact that “the statutory definition of a fund covered under the Volcker Rule is 
quite broad, but also the fact that the statute also quite broadly prohibits any banking 
entity that serves as the investment manager, adviser, or sponsor to a covered fund, or 
that organizes and offers a covered fund, from engaging in certain transactions with the 
fund, including lending to, or purchasing assets from, the fund.” Further identified 
challenging tasks which are involved in the implementation of the statutory provisions 
relate to the distinction between prohibited proprietary trading activities and permissible 
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market-making activities. This distinction, it is added “is important because of the key 
role that market makers play in facilitating liquid markets in securities, derivatives, and 
other assets. The distinction between prohibited proprietary trading and permissible 
market making can be difficult to draw, because these activities share several important 
characteristics.”  
 
 
In recommending means whereby greater demarcation between proprietary trading and 
permissible market could be achieved, two options are put forward: 
 
A simpler option which embraces 
- High-level principles for differentiating prohibited and permitted activities and then 
leaving it to the firms to self-report violations based on internal models or other devices, 
presumably with compliance and systems monitoring by regulatory agencies. 
A second alternative which would be to: 
- Establish definitive bright lines for determining whether an activity is permitted or 
prohibited. This approach, in his opinion, is considered to be very difficult in practice, 
based on the current information and data, because of the many asset classes, as well as 
business models, and transaction types covered by the statutory provisions. 
 
 
As reiterated at the end of the introductory section, even though advantages exist in 
stipulating clear mandates, certain disadvantages also emanate from the stipulation of 
mandates in a “clear and explicit” way which does not provide for flexibility in relation 
to an area such as financial stability – an area which, to a large extent, involves 
contingency issues
14
 and uncertainty. In achieving a certain and desired level of 
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flexibility, a combination of bright line rules and high level principles is therefore 
recommended. 
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D. Conclusion 
 
 
Non binding powers of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), as well as lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms (in the form of adequate levels of bright line rules and 
high level principles) – as illustrated by the statutory provisions implementing the 
Volcker Rule have been identified in this paper as being areas in need of redress. The 
Basel Committee is also a body which is in need of greater authority and more binding 
powers which would also require the incorporation of high level principles and bright line 
rules. Just as more effective coordination and communication would be required between 
standard setters and supervisors such as the Basel Committee and national supervisors 
involved in the implementation of Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act regulatory reforms, 
clearer and more “authoritative” mandates are essential in ensuring that the goals of 
financial stability are achieved. 
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